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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
COMMUNITY SERVICES
David Ferleger*
INTRODUCTION
"[1Institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit
from community settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions
that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of
participating in community life."'
"Pennhurst provides confinement and isolation, the antithesis of
habilitation."
2
"Institutions, by their very structure a closed and segregated
society founded on obsolete custodial models[,] can rarely
normalize and habilitate the mentally retarded citizen to the
extent of community programs created and modeled upon the
normalization and developmental approach components of
habilitation."3
Twenty-one years before the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. L. C.
(Olmstead)4 held that unjustified institutionalization is discrimination
forbidden by the Americans with Disabilities Act, a court issued the
landmark decision that all institutionalization of people with mental
retardation violates the United States Constitution and that states
have an obligation to provide community services to the
* University of Pennsylvania Law School, J.D., 1972. The author has a national litigation and
consulting practice in disability law. He filed, litigated, and argued the Pennhurst case, discussed below.
He was special master for a federal court for nine years in a case involving a state developmental
disabilities institution, and was a court-appointed monitor in similar litigation.
1. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 600 (1999).
2. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1978). For
subsequent history, see infra note 5.
3. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
4. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
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institutionalized.5 The first quotation above is from Olmstead in 1999
and the second two are from Halderman v. Pennhurst State School
and Hospital (Pennhurst) in 1978.
United States District Judge Raymond J. Broderick, author of
Pennhurst, was a conservative Republican jurist and former
Lieutenant Governor of Pennsylvania. He was not a judicial activist.
Those words did not come easily but after thoughtful consideration.
6
He was stirred in Pennhurst by the same considerations which shaped
Congress' findings in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 on
segregation and discrimination against people with disabilities.
7
5. Halderman, 446 F. Supp. at 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1978). The subsequent history of the case includes
two Supreme Court decisions and numerous other rulings. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp., 465 U.S. 89 (1984); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 49 F.3d 939 (3rd Cir. 1995); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp., 901 F.2d 311 (3d Cir. 1990); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 707 F.2d 702
(3d Cir. 1983); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 645 (3d Cir. 1982) (on remand);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 628 (3d Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84
(3d Cir. 1979); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (affirmed in part
and reversed in part); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 612 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979);
Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (original trial court
decision).
For first-hand analysis of the case, see generally David Ferleger & Patrice McGuire, Rights and Dignity:
Congress, the Supreme Court, and People with Disabilities After Pennhurst, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. REV.
327 (1983); David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. REV. 595
(1983); David Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst
Case, 31 STAN. L. REV. 717 (1979); David Ferleger, The Right to Community Care for the Retarded, in
NORMALIZATION, SOCIAL INTEGRATION AND COMMUNITY SERVICES (Robert J. Flynn & Kathleen E.
Nitsch, eds., 1980).
6. Judge Broderick interrogated witness after witness on the need for institutions:
"Would you agree with the other witnesses I've heard that it is time to sound the death
knell for institutions for the retardedT' Thus spoke United States District Judge Raymond
J. Broderick in the sixth week of trial. These words-soon to be echoed emphatically in
the court's unprecedented opinion-did not come easily. The judge had studied hard and
learned well. He spent the early days of trial listening to and interrogating expert after
expert to find out whether an institution was not in fact needed in the southeast comer of
Pennsylvania to serve 400 people. The answer was no. For 350 people? No. One
institution for the entire state? No. An institution for the most profoundly retarded with
physical handicaps? Again, the answer was no. Even the superintendent of the institution
told the court that there was no need to continue incarceration of the retarded at
Pennhurst.
David Ferleger & Penelope A. Boyd, Anti-Institutionalization: The Promise of the Pennhurst Case, 31
STAN. L. REV. 717, 718 (1979).
7. In adopting the ADA, Congress recognized that "historically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem," and that
"individuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of discrimination, including outright
[Vol. 26:3
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Pennhurst foreshadowed the Supreme Court's identification in
Olmstead v. L.C., of the profound negative impact of institutions on
those confined 8  and its holding that the ADA proscribes
"[u]njustified isolation of individuals with disabilities." 9
With a satisfied grin, whether in public or private, Judge Broderick
often observed that his decision recognizing the constitutional right to
community services was never reversed. 10 Indeed, while the 1978
decision precipitated two Supreme Court decisions on other grounds,
and a myriad of rulings on related issues, the constitutional holdings
were not questioned on appeal or certiorari. 1 The commitment to
alternatives to institutions, premised on constitutional rights,
espoused in Pennhurst was the groundwork for much other litigation,
became support for various states' policies, and a rallying point for
institutional residents, professionals in the field, and advocates. 
1 2
It was not until Olmstead, however, that the Supreme Court
weighed in on the institutionalization issue and this time, unlike
Pennhurst, there was a federal statutory ground for the decision.
13
The emergence of the "integration mandate" of the ADA, and the
intentional exclusion, . . . failure to make modifications to existing facilities and practices .... [and]
segregation." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (5) (2006) (emphasis added).
8. The Court stated the following:
Recognition that unjustified institutional isolation of persons with disabilities is a form of
discrimination reflects two evident judgments. First, institutional placement of persons
who can handle and benefit from community settings perpetuates unwarranted
assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life. [citations omitted] Second, confinement in an institution severely
diminishes the everyday life activities of individuals, including family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational advancement, and cultural
enrichment. [citation omitted] Dissimilar treatment correspondingly exists in this key
respect: In order to receive needed medical services, persons with mental disabilities
must, because of those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they could
enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons without mental disabilities can
receive the medical services they need without similar sacrifice.
Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600-01 (1999).
9. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 582 (1999).
10. Judge Broderick made the comment to the author and in various speeches and interviews, always
with the same confidence in the original constitutional grounding of his 1978 decision.
11. See supra note 5.
12. See E.g., MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 140-45 (1991); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet,
156 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (2007).
13. See Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Contra Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F.
Supp. 1295, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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Supreme Court's emphatic recognition in Olmstead of the benefits of
community services for people who are institutionalized has
diminished discussion of the constitutional inquiries which are the
focus of this article.
This is a moment for a "necessary and overdue"' 14 return to
constitutional principles as a means both to support the integration
mandate and to surmount some of the weaknesses of a purely ADA
and Olmstead approach.
I propose that involuntary institutionalization of people with
intellectual disabilities is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds. 15 Due process precludes needless curtailment of
personal liberty. Equal protection forbids discrimination against such
individuals unless necessitated by a compelling state interest, an
interest absent in non-criminal institutionalization. On groundwork
language in Olmstead, I suggest that the narrow class of involuntarily
institutionalized individuals with intellectual disabilities is a suspect
or quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause.
14. The phrase is from Dr. Morton Birnbaum whose writings inspired the call for recognition of a
right to treatment for people in institutions fifty years ago; he termed it a "necessary and overdue
development of our present concept of due process of law." Morton Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment,
46 A.B.A. J. 499, 503 (1960). The right to treatment did achieve recognition. For an early decision, see
Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1966). For the early development of the right, see
Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Mentally 111, 87 HARv. L. REV. 1190 (1974); Russell
Jackson Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney, 10 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 587 (1972);
Stanley Herr, Civil Rights, Uncivil Asylums and the Retarded, 43 U. CIN. L. REv. 679 (1974).
15. The caselaw is often imprecise in defining the individuals involved in the litigation discussed in
this article. What had been called "Mental Retardation" is currently defined as "Intellectual Disability"
by the American Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (formerly, the American
Association on Mental Retardation). ROBERT L. SCHALOCK ET AL., INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY:
DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORTS (lth ed. 2010). "Developmental
disabilities" is a broader category than mental retardation is statutorily (not clinically) defined. See
generally Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L.
No. 103-230, 108 Stat. 284 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 15002 (2000)).
Where contextually appropriate, I have chosen to use the term current in the field, that is,
"intellectual disability," to refer to what was formerly called "mental retardation." Although still
unfamiliar in the legal literature, and not yet adopted in the caselaw, intellectual disability will become
the norm in short order. However, where I refer to history, reported cases, or the published literature, I
sometimes use the original source's terminology. It should be kept in mind that, while the categories
overlap, there is a difference between developmental disabilities and intellectual disability with regard to
their clinical, social, and functional features. However, for the purposes of this article, the applicable
legal principles are the same.
While much of the analysis in this article might also apply to "mental illness," the discussion is
limited to the rights of people with intellectual disabilities.
[Vol. 26:3
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Restoration of constitutional rights to the conversation cures some
of the deficits in the Olmstead statutory construct. In addition, the
judicial armamentarium available to enforce constitutional rights
makes techniques available to enforce a broader and more powerful
responsibility on the part of the state to eliminate unnecessary
institutionalization through the expansion of quality community
services.
In this article, I briefly outline the Olmstead decision and then
discuss its limitations. I assume some familiarity with the history of
institutional and community care, and the litigation which preceded
Olmstead.16
I. THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
A. Olmstead: A "Qualified Yes " to Community Services
In Olmstead v. L.C., the United States Supreme Court held that
Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) 17
requires the placement of persons with mental disabilities in
community settings, rather than in institutions, when: (1) the state's
16. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999). The work of Jacobus tenBroek is groundbreaking
but often unacknowledged, Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law
of Torts, 54 CAL. L. REV. 841 (1966); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law
of Welfare, 54 CAL. L. REV. 809 (1966); see also, e.g., Samantha A. DiPolito, Olmstead v. L.C.-
Deinstitutionalization and Community Integration: An Awakening of the Nations' Conscience?, 58
MERCER L. REV. 1381, 1382-88 (2007) (nature and effects of institutionalization, and history of
community services); Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Callandrillo, Forward to Fundamental
Alteration: Addressing ADA Title Il Integration Lawsuits After Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 695, 703-05 (2001) (harms of institutionalization and benefits of community services); Mark C.
Weber, Home and Community-Based Services, Olmstead, and Positive Rights: A Preliminary
Discussion, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 269, 273-77 (2004) (history and nature of institutionalization).
On disability discrimination, see generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and
"Disability, " 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 418 (2000) ("subordinated status" of persons with a disability); Paula
E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of Disability in
Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 9 (1999); Jonathan C. Drimmer, Comment,
Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy
for People with Disabilities, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1341, 1357-58 (1993) (civil rights model of disability);
Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise ": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the Constitutional
"Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 Hous. L. REV. 999, 1005-10
(2000); Peter Blanck, "The Right to Live in the World": Disability Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 13
TEx. J. C.L. & C.R. 367 (2008).
17. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990).
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treatment professionals determine that such a placement is
appropriate, (2) the transfer is not opposed by the individual, and (3)
the placement can be reasonably accommodated given the resources
available to the state and its obligation to provide for the needs of
others with mental disabilities. 18 A five justice majority held that a
failure to provide care for individuals with mental disabilities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to their needs may be viewed as
discrimination, in violation of the ADA, unless the state or other
public entity can demonstrate an inability to provide less restrictive
care without "fundamentally alter[ing]" the nature of its programs.19
Congress passed the Americans with Disabilities Act in 1990.20
Designed as a comprehensive statutory scheme, the ADA seeks to
eliminate disability discrimination on three fronts: employment;
public services offered by public; and public services and
accommodations offered by private entities.
Prior to the ADA,2' Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197322
was the major statutory ground for challenge to discrimination
against people with disabilities.23 Section 504 provides relief when a
program or service receives federal funds and, thus, affects residents
of virtually all public institutions.24 Section 504 had been on the
books for years but it had proven of limited utility in affecting
deinstitutionalization, despite a regulatory integration requirement.
25
18. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (1999).
19. Id. at 592; 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (1998).
20. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990).
21. Id. § 12132.
22. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
23. Although Section 504 has been called "the cornerstone of the civil rights movement of the
mobility-impaired," its shortcomings and deficiencies quickly became apparent. ADAPT v. Skinner, 881
F.2d 1184, 1205 (3d Cir. 1989) (Mansmann, J., concurring). See, e.g., Timothy Cook, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L. REv. 393, 394-408 (1991) (the
Rehabilitation Act and its regulations have been practically a dead letter as a remedy for segregated
public services). One commentator has written that the weaknesses of section 504 arise from its statutory
language, "the limited extent of their coverage, inadequate enforcement mechanisms, and erratic judicial
interpretations." Robert L. Burgdorf Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications
of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 413, 431 (1991).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
25. See 29 U.S.C. § 794; 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2001) (providing that programs and activities shall be
administered "in the most integrated setting appropriate"). A number of courts held that the denial of
community based habilitation services to mentally disabled individuals does not constitute a viable
cause of action under section 504. E.g., Ky. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. Conn, 674 F.2d 582,
[Vol. 26:3
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The ADA differs from the Rehabilitation Act and other earlier
statutes in that it explicitly recognizes "institutionalization" and
"segregation" as forms of discrimination against disabled
individuals. 26 Also, the ADA required adoption of implementing
regulations.27 There are two regulations most relevant to the
Olmstead decision; together they comprise the "integration mandate"
of the ADA. The first is the integration regulation, which states: "A
public entity shall administer services, programs and activities in the
most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities. 28 The second is the reasonable
modifications regulation, which provides: "A public entity shall make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when
the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis
of disability, unless the public entity can demonstrate conclusively
that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature
of the service, program, or activity.,
29
Delivering the Court's Olmstead decision, Justice Ginsburg framed
the issue as "whether the [ADA's] proscription of discrimination may
require placement of persons with mental disabilities in community
settings rather then in institutions." 30 She expressed the Court's
answer conspicuously as "a qualified yes." 31
While the majority concluded that unnecessary institutionalization
32 3
violated the ADA, Justice Ginsburg spoke for a plurality of four.33
Justices O'Connor, Souter and Breyer joined her opinion as to the
fundamental alteration defense. 34  Justice Stevens would have
585 (6th Cir. 1982); Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1346 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Sabo v. O'Bannon,
586 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1984); Manecke v. Sch. Bd., 553 F. Supp. 787, 790 n. 4 (M.D. Fla.
1982), aftd in part and rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1985); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp.
171, 213 (D.N.H. 1981). These holdings, however, do not necessarily exclude application of Section 504
to egregious discrimination in a particular individual case.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (2006).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (2006) (attorney general to promulgate regulations).
28. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2001).
29. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2001).
30. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 587 (1999).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 587-603.
33. Id. (O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring with respect to Part I1I-B).
34. Id. at 603-07.
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affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals. 35 Justice Kennedy,
concurring separately, was concerned that the decision might
pressure the states into "attempting compliance on the cheap, placing
marginal patients into integrated settings devoid of the services and
attention necessary for their condition.,
36
The Court based its decision that unnecessary institutionalization is
a form of discrimination on two rationales. First, placing people with
disabilities who are capable of living in the community in institutions
perpetuates the stereotypes that such individuals are unworthy or
incapable of participating in community life.37 Second, confinement
in an institution deprives the individual of participation in a broad
spectrum of important activities, such as "family relations, social
contacts, work options, economic independence, educational
advancement, and cultural enrichment." 38 The Court recognized that
institutionalization implies discrimination: "[T]o receive needed
medical services, persons with mental disabilities must, because of
those disabilities, relinquish participation in community life they
could enjoy given reasonable accommodations, while persons
without mental disabilities can receive the medical services they need
without similar sacrifice."
39
Olmstead was heralded as a potentially "revolutionary" advance
for people with disabilities. Although other courts had previously
found the same protections in the ADA,4 1 Olmstead's conclusion that
Title II of the ADA forbids "[u]njustified isolation" of people with
disabilities was a defining moment.
42
35. Id. at 607-08.
36. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 610.
37. Id. at 600.
38. Id. at 601.
39. Id.
40. "Olmstead potentially has the capacity to transform and revolutionize mental health law."
Michael L. Perlin, "I Ain't Gonna Work on Maggie's Farm No More," Institutional Segregation,
Community Treatment, the ADA, and the Promise of Olmstead v. L.C., 17 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 53, 56
(2000); see also Mary C. Cerreto, Olnstead: The Brown v. Board of Education for Disability Rights:
Promises, Limits, and Issues, 3 LoY. J. PUB. INT. L. 47 (2001).
41. E.g., Helen L v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 333 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[T]he ADA and its attendant
regulations clearly define unnecessary segregation as a form of illegal discrimination against the
disabled.").
42. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 582.
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B. Olmstead's Shortcomings
Legal advocates and scholars are perhaps prone to overstate the
impact of particular cases on the world generally, as well as on the
law. That has been Olmstead's fortune. 43 While one might have
expected that the Olmstead decision would have accelerated
community placement, this has not been the case. In addition, the
decision is fraught with deficiencies which thwart achievement of the
right articulated by the Court, that is, to the right to be free from
unjustified isolation.
1. Movement from Institutions Has Slowed
Since the Olmstead decision, there has been a slowing of the
movement of residents from both public and private institutions,
according to an analysis marking the case's tenth anniversary.
44
Between June 30, 1990 and June 30, 1999, public institution
populations decreased by about 30,300 residents or 38.2%. 41 Private
institution residents decreased by about 13,700 persons or about
28.6%.46 These numerical and rate decreases were actually greater
for public institutions than those that followed Olmstead,47 which was
decided at the end of this ten year period.48 "Between June 30, 1999
and June 30, 2008, public institution populations decreased by about
14,100 people, or 28.6%, and private institution populations
decreased by about 10,400 people, or 30 .5%.'49 "Although there was
a modestly increased rate of private institution depopulation
43. Within two years of his hailing Olmstead, Professor Perlin was questioning its impact. Olmstead,
527 U.S. at 582. Professor Perlin asks, "Has Olmstead, so far, really made a difference? Or, are persons
institutionalized because of mental disability, still 'on the bottom?' Michael L. Perlin, "What's GoodIs
Bad, What's Bad Is Good, You '11 Find Out When You Reach the Top, You're on the Bottom ": Are the
Americans with Disabilities Act (and Olnstead v. L.C.) Anything More Than "Idiot Wind?", 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 235, 241 (2002).
44. K. Charlie Lakin, Naomi Scott, Sheryl Larson & Patricia Salmi, Marking the 10th Anniversary of
the Olmstead: Has It Made a Difference for People with Developmental Disabilities, 47 INTELL. &
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILrrTEs, Oct. 2009, at 406.
45. Id. at 404.
46. Id.
47. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581.
48. Lakin et al., supra note 44, at 404-06.
49. Id. at 406.
HeinOnline -- 26 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 771 2009-2010
]  I L  I    
 '  ings 
   
   
 l ste d's   
  
   ,  
 t  
 
  
. t tions s  
t   
   
t   l sis arking the case's tenth anniversary.44 
 , i  
  45  
  t 
    ter 
 l stead,47  
   
 ,    
 ,  
  . .'.4     
   
. it i  t  rs f is ili  l st , r f ss r rli  s sti i  its i t. l t , 
 . .  r  ,  ,  ,     ,   
i   t l '  tto ?'"    
d, d, u'll   , Oll    
bilities  d mste    / iot ?  
.    
. . li  i , i , l   i  i, i     f 
 t ad: s        t l bilities, .  
T L I I ITI S, t. , t . 
. d. t . 
. d. 
.  r lly l stead,  . . . 
. i  t I.,  t  , t . 
. d. t . 
9
Fergleger: The Constitutional Right to Community Services
Published by Reading Room, 2010
GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
following Olmstead,50  among public and private institutions
combined, the rates of depopulation were slightly lower after
[Olmstead] than before (36.9% and 29.4%, respectively)." 51
Why did this occur? Statistically, it was "because of the slowing
rate within public institutions" "driven by low rates of
deinstitutionalization in relatively few states." 52 The states slowest in
community movement are increasing the proportion of public
institution residents which they house.53 In 1990, the 10 slowest
states had 34% of the total public institution residents. 54 At the time
of the Olmstead decision, they had 43%, and by 2008, they had
52%. 5 Since Olmstead, these 10 states decreased their total public
institution populations by about 15% as compared with a 42%
reduction in the other states.
56
While these numbers cannot demonstrate an Olmstead cause-and-
effect, the researchers did find it "[more] evident.., that the effects
of Olmstead in the future, if any, will depend on the internal or
external motivation of a relatively small number of states to operate
in more consistent compliance with it." 57 This raises the question of
whether Olmstead alone is sufficient to provide a significant piece of
that motivation.
2. Olmstead Suffers from Internal Deficiencies
Apart from its lack of constitutional teeth, Olmstead58 suffers from
several internal deficiencies which weaken the force of its integration
mandate. These include a government-friendly fundamental alteration
defense and an effectively non-accountable "working plan" option to
demonstrate compliance.59
50. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 587.
51. [akin et al., supra note 44, at 406.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The public institutions' population was 84,239 in 1990, 49,105 in 1999, and 35,051 in 2008.
[akin et al., supra note 44, at 404.
57. Id. (emphasis added).
58. See generally Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
59. Id. at 584.
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a. "Fundamental Alteration"
The obligation of public entities to make reasonable modifications
of their policies, practices and procedures to avoid the discrimination
of unjustified segregation is limited by the "fundamental alteration"
defense. The entity is relieved of its obligation if "the public entity
can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally
alter the nature of the service, program, or activity."60 Courts must
consider whether "in the allocation of available resources, immediate
relief for the plaintiffs would be inequitable, given the responsibility
the State has undertaken for the care and treatment of a large and
diverse population of persons with.., disabilities." 61 Additional cost,
however, alone does not constitute a fundamental alteration.62 The
analysis is not limited to comparing institutional to community cost;
if that were the case, plaintiffs would generally always prevail.
The fundamental alteration defense may result in bizarre
acceptance of discrimination to the detriment of individuals deeply in
need. In Townsend v. Quasim,63 it was contended that the state's use
of community-based nursing services to provide essential long term
care to some disabled Medicaid recipients but not others violates
Title II of the ADA.64 The plaintiff, a man in his eighties with
medical and physical disabilities, was told by the Washington State's
Department of Social and Health Services that, based on new
definitions of services, he would have to move to a nursing home or
lose Medicaid benefits which provided him with community care.
65
The Ninth Circuit agreed that the state's action was discriminatory
but declined to provide relief, remanding because providing
60. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7) (2001) (emphasis added).
61. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 604. The section of Justice Ginsburg's opinion describing the standards to
be employed when analyzing a cost-based defense was joined by only four members of the Court.
Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion supported a state's discretion to adopt its own systems of cost
analysis. Id at 615 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
62. Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1183 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing H.R. REP. No.
101-485, at 50 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 473 ("While the integration of people with
disabilities will sometimes involve substantial short-term burdens, both financial and administrative, the
long-range effects of integration will benefit society as a whole." ).
63. See generally Townsend v. Quasim, 328 F.3d 511 (9th Cir. 2003).
64. Id. at 518.
65. ld. at514.
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community services "would fundamentally alter" the State's
Medicaid programs.66
A fundamental alteration might involve program integrity
(modification of the fundamental nature of the program, for example)
or magnitude (changes in the extent or cost of the system). 67 "No
clear statutory limits give guidance, and in the end any limits,
however vague, may have to come from courts. 68 Olmstead's impact
is "diluted by the Court's failure to provide meaningful parameters
for the defense" of fundamental alteration.
69
b. "Effectively Working Plan"
Justice Ginsburg's plurality gives states "leeway" to adopt a plan,
apparently in the context of a fundamental alteration defense:
To maintain a range of facilities and to administer services with
an even hand, the State must have more leeway than the courts
below understood the fundamental-alteration defense to allow. If,
for example, the State were to demonstrate that it had a
comprehensive, effectively working plan for placing qualified
persons with mental disabilities in less restrictive settings, and a
waiting list that moved at a reasonable pace not controlled by the
State's endeavors to keep its institutions fully populated, the
reasonable-modifications standard would be met.70
Each piece of this operational test-a "comprehensive, effectively
working plan," 71 a waiting list moving "at a reasonable pace not
controlled" by a State's effort to keep institutions filled72  raises
66. Id. at 520.
67. For a detailed discussion of the various flavors which might comprise "fundamental alteration,"
see Jefferson D.E. Smith & Steve P. Callandrillo, Forward to Fundamental Alteration: Addressing ADA
Title II Integration Lawsuits after Olmstead v. L.C., 24 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 695, 723-24 (2001).
68. Id. at 769.
69. Rosemary L. Bauman, Disability Law-Needless Institutionalization of Individuals with Mental
Disabilities as Discrimination Under the ADA -Olmstead v. L.C., 30 N.M. L. REv. 287, 287 (2000).
70. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,605-06 (1999).
71. Id. at584.
72. Id.
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difficult interpretive questions. It is a challenge to put meaning into
these terms. "The standards established under the majority decision
for measuring when statutory violations under the ADA occur in the
context of health services for persons with disabilities are, in fact,
quite murky; furthermore, the powers granted to States to determine
the scope of their own obligations, as well as the affirmative defenses
they are accorded, are extensive."
73
Of course, any test of compliance would raise definitional and
interpretive questions. Here, however, where the State's "leeway"
allows it to put its thumb on the scale, one is hard put to expect courts
to require meaty and prompt implementation of Olmstead plans.
All changes to complex systems, when done well, necessitate
careful planning. Planning will typically include analysis,
development of a mission, goals and objectives, expected outcomes,
tasks and timelines, deadlines, identification of persons responsible,
quality assurance and accountability mechanisms, and evaluation.
Consequently, a self-adjusting system will be in place, with sufficient
feedback and flexibility to adapt to changing conditions. A plan for
movement from institutions would be expected to encompass these
elements.
Enforcement of civil rights, especially class-wide enforcement,
often requires a change of complex systems. Courts, however, look to
results. Judicial orders require compliance. An unimplemented plan is
insufficient to satisfy the court that its involvement must come to an
end.
The plurality opinion in Olmstead invites a "plan" which itself
would satisfy the integration mandate announced in the decision.
74
Devoid of mention of compliance or enforcement, the Olmstead plan
has such scant required content that it has been characterized as a
73. Sara Rosenbaun, Joel Teitelbaum & Alexandra Stewart, Olmstead v. L.C.: Implications for
Medicaid and Other Publicly Funded Health Services, 12 HEALTH MATRIx 93, 94 (2002). For example,
the authors point out the vagueness in the "reasonable pace" piece of the puzzle; "there are no general
standards for measuring what constitutes a 'reasonable pace' for purposes of Olmstead-related planning,
nor is there an explanation regarding how the reasonable pace standard might vary depending on the
nature of the condition or service need at issue." Id. at 137.
74. See generally Olnstead, 527 U.S. 581.
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"get out of jail free" card for states otherwise in violation of the
decision's integration mandate."
75
Some courts have held that a mere history of deinstitutionalization,
even absent stated goals or guidelines, satisfies Olmstead, while
others have accepted as satisfactory mere confirmation that a plan
exists.76 Even a "successful record" and a plan "to continue and
increase" unspecific programs were held sufficient. 7
Courts are certainly limited in ability and resources to shepherd all
the details of compliance,78 but they are competent to ensure
compliance, even in the most complex situations.79 A case in point is
United States v. State of Connecticut in which Senior U.S. District
Judge Ellen Bree Bums found the state in contempt of a consent
decree intended to reform a large mental retardation institution,
Southbury Training School (STS). 80 The court found deficiencies in
such areas as medical care, psychiatric services, psychological
programs, physical therapy, injuries, and protection from harm,
concluding that "STS's systemic flaws have caused many residents to
suffer grave harm, and, in several instances, death., 81 The court
appointed a special master to review "all aspects" of STS's care,
"determine the changes needed," "formulate specific methods to
75. John F. Muller, Olmstead v. L.C. and the Voluntary Cessation Doctrine: Toward a More Holistic
Analysis of the "'Effectively Working Plan," 118 YALE L.J. 1013,1014 (2009).
76. In Muller, supra note 75, the following "working plan" cases are discussed: Arc of Wash. State
Inc. v. Braddock, 427 F.3d 615 (9th Cir. 2005); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir.
2005); Frederick L. v. Dep 't of Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 11), 422 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 2005); Pa. Prot. &
Advocacy, Inc. v. Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 402 F.3d 374, 377 (3d Cir. 2005); Frederick L. v. Dep't of
Pub. Welfare (Frederick L. 1), 364 F.3d 487 (3d Cir. 2004); Bryson v. Stephen, No. 99-CV-558-SM,
2006 WL 2805238, at *4 (D.N.H. Sept. 29, 2006); Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591 (D. Md.
2001); Kathleen S. v. Dep 't of Pub. Welfare, No. 97-6610, 1999 WL 1257284 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 23, 1999);
Makin ex rel. Russell v. Hawaii, 114 F. Supp. 2d 1017 (D. Haw. 1999). See Melody M. Kubo,
Implementing Olmstead v. L.C.: Defining "Effectively Working" Plans for "Reasonably Placed" Wait
Lists for Medicaid Home and Community-Based Services Waiver Programs, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 731
(2001).
77. Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005).
78. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in Expanding "We the
People": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 49, 58 (2004).
79. See generally David Ferleger, Special Master Rules: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, The
Role of Special Masters in the Judicial System, 2004 Special Masters Conference: Transcript of
Proceedings, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1193 (2005).
80. United States v. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. 974, 974 (D. Conn. 1996), appeal dismissed, United
States v. Connecticut, 116 F.3d 466 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom., 522 U.S. 1045 (1998).
8 1. Connecticut, 931 F. Supp. at 984.
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implement the required changes," and help "effectuate those
changes." 82 The special master actively oversaw a detailed remedial
plan, holding hearings where necessary, and after nine years, the state
achieved compliance at the institution and was purged of contempt.
83
The Olmstead "working plan" option is problematic. It does not
describe the minimum elements of such a plan and does not require
timely outcomes and compliance. Most importantly, its emphasis on
states' "leeway" discourages the lower courts from mandating and
enforcing full-bodied plans, and ensuring that desired outcomes are
achieved before the court bows out of involvement.
c. Absence of Guidance on Standard of Care
The Olmstead Court stated in footnote 14, "We do not in this
opinion hold that the ADA imposes on the States a 'standard of care'
for whatever medical services they render, or that the ADA requires
States to 'provide a certain level of benefits to individuals with
disabilities., 84  Justice Kennedy's concurrence is stronger. He
concluded that, given states' need to weigh their priorities, "[i]t
follows that a State may not be forced to create a community-
treatment program where none exists." 85 He did not, however,
explain how one distinguishes between "creation" and "expansion" of
community programs.
The multiplicity of opinions and the weak language cited above
opens the possibility that Olmstead's reach may be cut short in future
82. Id.
83. This article's author was the special master. The court described the success of this judicial
oversight in a parallel case involving the same institution:
In a process of evaluation lasting almost a decade, the Special Master, with the assistance
of experts commissioned by him and the parties, measured improvements at STS against
the standards set forth in the Court Requirements. Periodically, when the Special Master
concluded that the defendants had demonstrated compliance with a particular Court
Requirement, he recommended that the court release STS from oversight for that Court
Requirement. Finally, in 2006, after the Special Master found STS to be in compliance
with all remaining requirements of the Remedial Plan, the court released STS from
judicial oversight and purged the defendants of contempt. See Order Purging Defendants
of Contempt and Ending Active Judicial Oversight, US. v. Connecticut, (Mar. 24, 2006).
Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 299-300 (D. Conn. 2008).
84. Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 603 n.14 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 613.
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rulings. The language does not appear to support even the minimally
adequate level of habilitation which Youngberg v. Romeo8 6 held is
required.
d Silence on the Respective Roles of the Legislature and Courts
Constrained perhaps by internal divisions, the Court was muted in
its endorsement of vigorous efforts to move to a fully community-
oriented system. Institutional settings may be "terminated" but not for
people "unable to handle or benefit" thereby. 87 Institutions may be
"phased out" so long as this does not place "patients in need of close
care at risk.",88 These qualifications meet the concerns expressed in
Justice Kennedy's opinion.
This limited closure mandate appears calculated to appeal both to
those who disfavor institutions as well as to those concerned that
some residents may not be well served in the community. While no
one would intentionally adopt a "phase out" effort, or place even a
single person into the community, if it would predictably cause harm,
analysis of risk and benefit is a complex calculus in human services.
Missing from the Court's brief "yes, but. . . "discussion is the nature
of the balance in this sensitive arena between the legislative policy-
setting role and the judicial role in the definition and enforcement of
rights. Also missing is the question of what weight to give the
constitutional liberty interests of the individual and his or her desires,
or that of parents or guardians. One wishes for clearer guidance from
the Court on these issues.
II. THE CONSTITUTION
A. The Parameters of a Constitutional Right to Community Services
As recently as 2000, a scholar in the field correctly characterized
the constitutional dimensions of a right to community treatment as "a
86. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
87. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 602.
88. Id. at 583.
[Vol 26:3
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mostly-moribund body of law."'8 9 With the Olmstead statutory
holding, 90 constitutional analysis took a backseat to examination of
the extent to which the ADA might afford relief to the
institutionalized. As I explain below, a comprehensive legal theory
embodying both constitutional and statutory rights is more likely to
serve private and public needs than a theory including just one or the
other.91
I contend that institutionalization of individuals with intellectual
disabilities, without their consent, violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution92 where the person could "handle and benefit from" an
end to confinement and the provision of habilitation and supports in a
community placement.93 In addition, long term confinement, without
effective periodic review of the justification for that confinement, is a
due process violation.
For these individuals, institutionalization, as lived out in our times,
is often a lifetime proposition. Institutional populations are aging on
account of very low admissions and deaths. The few admissions since
adoption in the 1970s of right to education laws and expansion of
community services since that time have resulted in skewing the
institutional census toward higher age groups. The institutions' age
groupings "reflect the aging of the US population but in an
exaggerated way. E.g., in 1977, 22% were 40 years and older;
89. Michael L. Perlin, "Their Promises of Paradise": Will Olmstead v. L.C. Resuscitate the
Constitutional "Least Restrictive Alternative" Principle in Mental Disability Law?, 37 HOUS. L. REV.
999, 1022 (2000).
90. Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581, 607 (holding that states are required to provide community-based
treatment for persons with mental disabilities when such placement is appropriate).
91. See infra Part 2.
92. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
93. The "handle and benefit from" standard is repeated twice in the Olmstead plurality opinion:
"First, institutional placement of persons who can handle and benefit from community
settings perpetuates unwarranted assumptions that persons so isolated are incapable or
unworthy of participating in community life." Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600 (emphasis
added).
"We emphasize that nothing in the ADA or its implementing regulations condones
termination of institutional settings for persons unable to handle or benefit from
community settings." Id at 601-02 (emphasis added).
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1987=33.3%; 1998=57.1%; 2006=72.1%.,, 94 By comparison to the
institutionalized 72.1%, 45% of the United States population in 2006
were 40 years and older.95 Residence in an institution for people with
intellectual disabilities often lasts decades and can be commitment
for the life of the individual.96
The Supreme Court has long recognized that civil confinement
entails a "massive curtailment of liberty."97 The only permissible
justifications for committing the mentally disabled are: (1) danger to
the individual, (2) danger to others, and (3) need for treatment.98 The
Court enunciated the following principle in Jackson v. Indiana,
striking down a state law that permitted the state to confine
indefinitely a mentally deficient deaf mute adjudged incompetent to
stand trial: "At the least, due process requires that the nature and
duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose
for which the individual is committed." 99
Jackson's "nature, duration and purpose" criteria have become the
touchstone (often unacknowledged) for the development of
procedural and substantive due process, and for equal protection
safeguards of the rights of the institutionalized. It is to those rights
that I now turn.
94. E-mail from R. Charlie Lakin, Institute on Community Integration, University of Minnesota, to
author (Sept. 4, 2009) (on file with author).
95. United States Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey, S0101, Age and Sex,
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/STTable? bm=y&-qrname=ACS_2006ESTGOO S0101&-
geo_id=01000US&-dsname=ACS_2006_ESTG00_&-_lang--en (last visited Feb. 17, 2010).
96. Failure to provide adequate habilitation may well mean commitment for the life of the individual.
Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487, 497 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd in part, vacated, remanded in part, 550
F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315 (E.D.
Pa. 1978).
97. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 131 (1990); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 491-92 (1980)
(commitment to mental hospital entails "'a massive curtailment of liberty,"' and requires due process
protection); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (there is a "substantial liberty interest in not being
confined unnecessarily for medical treatment"); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979) ("[C]ivil
commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process
protection."); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738
(1972).
98. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 737.
99. Id.; see also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1972).
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B. Due Process
1. Procedural Due Process
A procedural due process violation occurs when one is deprived of
a significant interest protected under the Constitution without
appropriate procedures to protect against unfairness and error. 100 This
interest can arise either from the Constitution itself or from state
law.'10 Post-Olmstead decisions have not generally required periodic
review in a formal sense. The model has been to require the
institution to review and to "consider" each resident for possible
placement i
02
A person confined in an institution who protests that confinement
is entitled to a meaningful hearing-a periodic review-on the
person's continuing need for institutionalization. 10 3 The need for
commitment must be reviewed periodically by a neutral fact finder.'
0 4
In concluding that a woman confined for decades at a state institution
for people with mental retardation had a procedural due process right
to such reviews, the Third Circuit noted, "[t]he hearing tribunal must
have the authority to afford relief."10 5 Other courts agree. 10 6 The
review must not be pro forma and must not be biased toward the
status quo. It has been held that, while Due Process does not require a
100. Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 (1979); see generally Vitek, 445 U.S. at 480 (1980) (transfer of
prisoner to mental hospital); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 466 (1983).
102. See, e.g., Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 343 (D. Conn. 2008) ("The
evidence indicates that the defendants generally failed to exercise professional judgment in considering
community placement for a large number of class members regardless of the degree of their disability,
but the plaintiffs have not established that the defendants failed to consider more severely disabled class
members for community placement.").
103. The need for review is implied in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1975) ("Nor is
it enough that Donaldson's original confinement was founded upon a constitutionally adequate basis, if
in fact it was, because even if his involuntary confinement was initially permissible, it could not
constitutionally continue after that basis no longer existed.").
104. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 613 (1979) (requiring the periodic review implied in Donaldson v.
O'Connor).
105. Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607
(1979)).
106. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1395-96 (6th Cir. 1988) ("Of course, because
involuntary commitment cannot continue after the basis for that commitment ceases to exist, due process
requires that some periodic review take place during confinement."), cert. denied sub. nom., Cowherd v.
Doe ex rel. Doe, 488 U.S. 967 (1988); Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346,1353 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
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judicial fact finder for periodic review of commitment of persons
with intellectual disabilities, Equal Protection requires judicial
periodic review of continuing need for institutionalization if people
with mental illness receive such review. 
107
2. Substantive Due Process
Until its indirect evisceration in the Supreme Court's decisions in
Youngberg v. Romeo (on Due Process) and Pennhurst State School
and Hospital v. Halderman (on the Developmentally Disabled
Assistance and Bill of Rights Act), "the concept of the least
restrictive alternative-the idea that restrictivity of confinement can
and must be calibrated and evaluated-ha[s] remained one of the core
staples of mental disability law.' 1 8  Youngberg focused on
institutional treatment rights, and Pennhurst rejected a statutory
community services right. 10 9 There followed a line of cases in the
mid-to-late 1980s rejecting the "least restrictive" basis for community
services. 110
What has survived the disfavor of the least restrictive analysis,
however, is robust law on other grounds. Two conceptual strands
107. Doe ex rel. Doe, 848 F.2d at 1395-96.
108. Michael L. Perlin, supra note 89, at 1000. For a review of the 1970s and early 1980s community
placement court decisions, see id. at 1022-25. See Dixon v. Weinberger, 405 F. Supp. 974, 980 (D.D.C.
1975) (mental hospital must plan for treatment of plaintiff patients in "suitable residential facilities
under the least restrictive [alternative] conditions"); David Ferleger, Anti-Institutionalization and the
Supreme Court, 14 RUTGERS L. J. 595, 598 & n. 12 (1983) (judicial action has provided thousands with
more humane services in community facilities); Melissa G. Warren & Robert R. Moon, Dixon: In the
Absence of Political Will, Carry a Big Stick, 18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 329, 330 (1994) (mental health
de-institutionalization order); see generally Brewster v. Dukakis, 544 F. Supp. 1069 (D. Mass. 1982)
(mem.), aff'das modified, 786 F.2d 16 (1st Cir. 1986) (mental health deinstitutionalization order).
109. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (stating that nothing in the
Developmental Disabilities Act suggests Congress intended to require the states to provide 'appropriate
treatment' in the 'least restrictive environment"' to citizens with developmental disabilities); Youngberg
v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
110. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243, 1248-49 (5th Cir. 1987); Soc'y for Good Will to
Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1249 (2d Cir. 1984); Phillips v. Thompson, 715 F.2d 365,
368 (7th Cir.1983); see Jackson v. Fort Stanton Hosp. & Training Sch., 964 F.2d 980, 992 (10th Cir.
1992) ("Community placement is only one of various possible ways in which the state may comply with
its constitutional obligations to adequately care for and train involuntarily committed individuals.");
Hanson ex rel. Hanson v. Clarke County, 867 F.2d 1115, 1120 (8th Cir. 1989) (denying plaintiff's
contention that she had right to funding for placement in the "least restrictive environment consistent
with qualified professional judgment"); Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346, 1351 (S.D. Iowa 1993).
See generally Gieseking v. Schafer, 672 F. Supp. 1249 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
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form the basis for the substantive due process right to treatment for
the institutionalized. Although they are intertwined, they each have
been considered to provide independent support for the right. The
quid pro quo approach considers that the massive curtailment of
liberty occasioned by involuntary civil institutionalization, for which
criminal justice procedural safeguards are absent, cannot be justified
unless the state gives to the institutionalized person something in
exchange for the loss of liberty."' That "something" is habilitation.
The parens patriae approach is that due process is violated when the
state fails to provide treatment to a person dependent on the state.
There is no need for detailed analysis here of whether the right to
treatment arises under the quid pro quo or the parens patriae
theory.1
12
The quid pro quo position finds support in the Supreme Court's
ruling in O 'Connor v. Donaldson that "a State cannot constitutionally
confine without more a non-dangerous individual who is capable of
surviving safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and
responsible family members or friends." ' 13 Absent treatment (or
whatever the Court meant by "more"), the deprivation of liberty is
unjustified. Courts have applied this rationale to confinement of
people with retardation."
14
Partaking of the parens patriae interest is the holding of
Youngberg v. Romeo,"15 and its progeny, that due process requires
that an institution provide its residents with a minimal level of
training or "habilitation." 116 In Youngberg, the Supreme Court
111. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975).
112. See Bruce G. Mason & Frank J. Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Retarded
Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 CREIGHTON L. REv. 124 (1976); Donald H.J.
Hermann, Barriers to Providing Effective Treatment: A Critique of Revisions in Procedural,
Substantive, and Dispositional Criteria in Involuntary Civil Commitment, 39 VAND. L. REV. 83, 85
(1986).
113. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 576.
114. See United States v. Jackson, 553 F.2d 109, 119 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp.
487, 496 (D. Minn. 1974) (relying on Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), for holding that if
plaintiffs are subject to "detention for mere illness without a curative program," their confinement is
unconstitutional).
115. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
116. A recent acknowledgement of this right is Judge Ellen Bree Bums' detailed decision in Messier
v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 303 (D. Conn. 2008), finding that institutional
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concluded, first, that "[t]he mere fact that Romeo has been committed
under proper procedures does not deprive him of all substantive
liberty interests under the Fourteenth Amendment." 117 There are
additional liberty interests and they require the State to provide
minimally adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and
freedom from undue restraint."11 8 The treatment interests are not
"absolute." Whether the constitutional rights have been violated must
be determined by "balancing his liberty interests against the relevant
state interests. '119
These constitutional requirements are satisfied when there has been
a "professional judgment" in determining what services and care
should be provided to residents of state-run institutions. 120 A
violation of the professional judgment requirement may be shown in
at least two ways:
a. Where no professional judgment has been exercised (including
situations where a facility administrator ignores
recommendations of professionals), 12' and
b. Where the judgment made by a qualified professional was
"such a substantial departure from accepted professional
judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the person
conditions generally had been improved from its prior level of dangerousness and other deficiencies to
satisfy constitutional muster.
117. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315.
118. Id. at 319 & n.24 (noting that, in the concurring opinion in the appellate court with which the
Supreme Court agreed, the concurring judge had "used the term 'treatment' as synonymous with
training or habilitation"). Residents also have a constitutionally protected interest in medical care, safe
conditions and in freedom from bodily restraint except to the extent that restraint must be used to assure
safety. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 315-16.
119. Id. at 321.
120. Id.
121. Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 300 (citing Valentine v. Strange, 597 F. Supp. 1316, 1318 (E.D.
Va. 1 984) (declining to dismiss complaint by patient who set fire to herself after hospital officials took
no action to confiscate her cigarettes and lighter despite unsuccessful effort to bum herself earlier in the
day), and Cameron v. Tomes, 783 F. Supp. 1511, 1520-21 (D. Mass. 1992) (finding due process
violation where facility's administrator ignored recommendation of professionals and ordered a patient
to be transported in shackles)).
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responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.' 122
The issue is "not whether the optimal course of treatment as
determined by some experts was being followed" but whether
professional judgment was exercised. 123  Where professional
judgment establishes that provision of minimally adequate treatment
requires community services, an institutionalized person's
substantive due process rights are violated. 124  Youngberg did not
address institutional judgments favoring placement. 125
Youngberg requires balancing an institutionalized person's liberty
interests against the "relevant state interests", which the Court
identified not as budgetary or administrative but rather as the state's
interest in ensuring the exercise of professional judgment.126
For many individuals with intellectual disabilities in public
institutions, the judgment exercised by the institution's professionals
themselves is that the confinement is not necessary and that
community services would be beneficial. Therefore, not surprisingly,
122. Id. at 301. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
123. Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d Cir. 1984); P.C.
v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1990) (courts do not determine that "the best course of
action was taken"); Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 301; Griffith v. Ledbetter, 711 F. Supp. 1108, 1110
(N.D. Ga. 1989).
124. It is important to note that "[t]he decisions of the treating professionals are not conclusive," and
the opinions of experts at trial may be "relevant to whether the treating professionals' decisions
substantially departed from accepted standards." Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 614 (D.
Md. 2001) (citing Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted)). This
case is the fourth in the "Thomas S." line of cases: Thomas S. v. Morrow (Thomas S. 1), 601 F. Supp.
1055 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Thomas S. v. Morrow (Thomas S. 11), 781 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1986); Thomas S.
v. Flaherty (Thomas S. 111), 699 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D.N.C. 1988); and Thomas S. v. Flaherty (Thomas S.
/M, 902 F.2d 250 (4th Cir. 1990).
125. Based on what turned out to be an incorrect premise, community placement was thought to be
beyond the facts of the case. The Court noted that, at oral argument, "Respondent, in light of the severe
character of his retardation, concedes that no amount of training will make possible his release."
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317. However, Nicolas Romeo was released from Pennhurst and moved to a
community group home. E-mail from Edmund Tiryak, Romeo's counsel, to author (Sept. 10, 2009,
08:21:30 EST) (on file with author).
126. Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 321 ("We think the standard articulated by Chief Judge Seitz affords the
necessary guidance and reflects the proper balance between the legitimate interests of the State and the
rights of the involuntarily committed to reasonable conditions of safety and freedom from unreasonable
restraints. He would have held that 'the Constitution only requires that the courts make certain that
professional judgment in fact was exercised. It is not appropriate for the courts to specify which of
several professionally acceptable choices should have been made."').
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Youngberg has been extended to embrace a due process right to
community services.'27
On the other hand, some courts (mostly before Olmstead) have
declared that residents of state institutions for people with mental
retardation "have no right to community placement."' 28 Virtually in
the same breath, however, "no-right" courts have acknowledged that
state decisions which deprive individuals of liberty, which result in
their institutionalization, are subject to scrutiny under Youngberg and
due process principles; confinement must be "rational., 129 We see in
these decisions a profound judicial disquiet with a constitutional
fabric which would uphold use of governmental power to
involuntarily confine people when it is acknowledged that
confinement is not justified by considerations of adequate care and
treatment. In considering the Youngberg balance between a person's
liberty interests and the state's interests, Olmstead's recognition that
the ADA forbids unjustified institutionalization must be placed in the
balance.
127. See generally Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1986); Homeward Bound, Inc., v. Hissom
Memorial Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at *19 (N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987) ("Freedom from
bodily restraint includes the right to be free from confinement in an institution where such confinement
is shown on a factual basis to be unnecessary.").
128. Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 319; Soc'y for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1249; Phillips v. Thompson,
715 F.2d 365, 368 (7th Cir. 1983); Garrity v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 237-39 (D.N.H. 1981). Pre-
Youngberg, there were cases which did not appreciate the significance of the liberty deprivation. E.g.,
Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 488 (D.N.D. 1982) (questioning
whether institutionalization "compromises a fundamental liberty interest" and suggesting that "the state
may have a compelling interest in just safekeeping-rather than habilitating-mentally retarded
persons").
129. "Community placement decisions are, however, subject to scrutiny under Youngberg. Like any
other decision to place restraints on a patient's freedom, the decision to keep a resident in an institution
instead of placing the resident in a community setting must be 'a rational decision based on professional
judgment."' Messier, 562 F. Supp. 2d at 319 (quoting Soc "yfor Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1249) (citations
omitted). As one court put it, if "a patient were being held against his will contrary to all the medical
evidence and expert medical opinion, there would clearly be a constitutional violation." Hughes v.
Cuomo, 862 F. Supp. 34, 37 (W.D.N.Y. 1994).
Some courts flatly disagreed pre-Olmstead that there is any due process right to community services.
S.H. v. Edwards, 860 F.2d 1045, 1051-52 (11 th Cir. 1988) (Constitution does not bestow any "right" to
receive state-provided mental health treatment in a community setting rather than in an institutional
one); Soc 'y for Good Will, 737 F.2d at 1247 ("[M]ere residence in an institution or school for the
mentally retarded, without more, does not violate due process.").
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C. Equal Protection
1. Introduction
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
requires that similarly situated individuals should be treated similarly.
When state law or practice do not employ suspect classifications or
impinge on fundamental rights, they are upheld when they are
rationally related to a legitimate public purpose.'
30
When the government acts on the basis of a suspect classification
or affecting a fundamental interest, the traditional rational basis
standard is abandoned in favor of what has been called "strict
scrutiny." Strict scrutiny admits of little or no presumption of validity
of the challenged state action.
An intermediate level of scrutiny is afforded classifications
involving "quasi-suspect" classes such as gender and illegitimacy.'
3 1
To withstand constitutional challenge, a classification disfavoring a
quasi-suspect class must "serve important governmental objectives
and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives., 132
I advance two arguments here. First, I propose that forcible and
unnecessary institutionalization of people with intellectual disabilities
is irrational and therefore unconstitutional under the traditional equal
protection framework. Second, I conclude that a class definition for
equal protection purposes narrower than all "the disabled" is subject
to at least the intermediate degree of scrutiny. Rather than define the
protected group as "the disabled" generically, one would focus on
those among the disabled who are maximally deprived of liberty and
who are a close fit to the "special condition" class described in
footnote 4 of United States v. Carolene Products,133 and its "strict
130. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). See generally City of Clebume v. Clebume Living Ctr.,
473 U.S. 432 (1985); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (1981); Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981);
Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
13I. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (acknowledgement of middle tier scrutiny).
132. Id.
133. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) ("Nor need we inquire
whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious, or
national, or racial minorities, whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
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scrutiny" progeny. This approach would bring to bear the protections
of the suspect or quasi-suspect class analysis on the discrimination
inherent in institutionalization.
2. Needless Institutionalization Is Irrational
Freedom from segregation has long been recognized as an interest
protected by the Equal Protection Clause.' 34 Where a state forcibly
excludes, separates and segregates people with mental retardation
from the rest of society, and where equivalent or superior care (and
quality of life) is available in a non-segregated setting, a serious
question arises whether such action is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.
Classifications impinging on fundamental rights have been
invalidated as irrational. 135 One of the rare instances in which the
Supreme Court held that discrimination (not on the basis of gender or
race) was irrational involved community living for individuals with
retardation. Finding that a city's zoning exclusion of a community
home was irrational, the Court found a violation of equal
protection. 136 Similarly, it is not rational, or logical or humane, to
compel institutional segregation where it is not necessary for the
individual. One can demonstrate that, for each person in the
institution, there is a "twin" living successfully in the community
with equivalent disabilities. The institution for these individuals is
definitively "separate but not equal."'
137
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry." (citations omitted)).
134. See generally Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. See e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (access by married and unmarried to
contraception).
136. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432,432 (1985).
137. See Homeward Bound, Inc., v. Hissom Memorial Ctr., No. 85-C-437-E, 1987 WL 27104, at *19
(N.D. Okla. July 24, 1987) (finding institutionalization of people with retardation to be an irrational
discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause). Gieseking v. Schafer recognized that a state
may not treat a class of residents with developmental disabilities irrationally under the Equal Protection
Clause, finding it a question of fact which could not be decided on summary judgment. Gieseking v.
Schafer, 672 F. Supp. 1249, 1264 (W.D. Mo. 1987).
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3. Institutionalized Individuals with Intellectual Disabilities
Constitute a Quasi-suspect Class
The Supreme Court has not yet considered whether people with
intellectual disabilities who are institutionalized constitute a suspect
or quasi-suspect class under the Equal Protection Clause. Twice, the
Court has dodged the issue; both occasions occurred after passage of
the ADA.138 Perhaps the Court recognizes that post-ADA there is
more to be said on the issue.
The majority opinion in Olmstead evidences a leaning toward the
position I espouse here. Referencing the "unwarranted assumptions
that persons so isolated are incapable or unworthy of participating in
community life,"' 139 the Court cited two cases, one on racial
classification and one on gender discrimination: Allen v. Wright and
Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart. 140 Neither was an
equal protection case; however, the comparison of the irrational
stereotyping and stigmatization of institutionalized people with
disabilities to treatment of race and gender discrimination is telling.
A number of commentators have argued with force that the ADA
itself, with its Congressional findings echoing the well-known criteria
in footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products,14 1 compels
138. The Supreme Court declined to address an argument for heightened scrutiny of claims by people
with mental retardation regarding commitment, finding that the issue had not been raised below. Heller
v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993) (challenge by class of individuals with mental retardation to
constitutionality of Kentucky's involuntary commitment procedures and holding that procedures met
rational basis test under Equal Protection Clause). In opening her opinion in Olmstead, Justice Ginsburg
stated, "This case, as it comes to us, presents no constitutional question," and, citing Cleburne, noted
that "the courts below resolved the case solely on statutory grounds." Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581,
587 (1999).
139. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 600.
140. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (race); Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 n.13 (1978).
141. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The ADA's findings, at 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(7) originally read-quoting Carolene virtually verbatim-, "individuals with disabilities are a
discrete and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political powerlessness in our
society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from
stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual ability of such individuals to participate in,
and contribute to, society .... This paragraph was removed by sections 3(2) and (3) of the Americans
with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 110th Cong., 2d
Sess. (Sept. 25, 2008). This change does not alter the 1990 Congress' characterization of the status of
people with disabilities.
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courts to employ a "strict scrutiny" or "compelling state interest" test.
Such an argument would be reasonable. 142 It is certainly within easy
reach to find that, because "the mentally retarded still suffer from
some discrimination that is not related to actual disabilities," state
action "must be reviewed under a level of scrutiny higher than the
rational basis test.' 43 For example, Michael Perlin in the immediate
aftermath of Olmstead, urged that an ADA violation is per se a
Fourteenth Amendment violation:
The law's invocation of the full "sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment" simply means that any violation of the ADA must
be read in the same light as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution, guaranteeing, for the first time, that
this core constitutional protection will finally be made available
to persons with disabilities. 44
This view won wide support in the literature' 45 before the Supreme
Court's 2001 decision to the contrary in the Garrett case, discussed
below.
142. The suspect class criteria are a) whether the class has a history of purposeful unequal treatment,
b) whether the class has such political powerlessness as to require extraordinary protection from the
majoritarian political process, and c) whether the class is generally denied legal benefits on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam).
Each of these criteria has support in both history and case law.
143. See Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 490 (D.N.D. 1982)
(requiring the "state to show that disparities in educational opportunity which exist between the mentally
retarded and other citizens substantially furthers important state interests").
144. Perlin, supra note 40, at 59-60.
145. See Marcia Pearce Burgdorf & Robert Burgdorf, Jr., A History of Unequal Treatment: The
Qualifications of Handicapped Persons as a "Suspect Class " Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 855, 905 (1975). James B. Miller, The Disabled, the ADA, and Strict Scrutiny, 6
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 393, 413 (1994); Leonard S. Rubenstein, Ending Discrimination Against Mental
Health Treatment in Publicly Financed Health Care, 40 ST. Louis U. L.J. 315, 339 (1996) (analyzing
the ADA's invocation of the Carolene Products footnote); William Christian, Note, Normalization as a
Goal: The Americans with Disabilities Act and Individuals with Mental Retardation, 73 TEX. L. REV.
409, 424 (1994) (stating that laws treating persons with disabilities differently should be subject to
heightened scrutiny); Amy Lowndes, Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: A
Congressional Mandate for Heightened Judicial Protection of Disabled Persons, 44 FLA. L. REV. 417,
446 (1992) (discussing Congress' ADA findings); Lisa Montanaro, Comment, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Will the Court Get the Hint? Congress' Attempt to Raise the Status of Persons with
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There is no precedential obstacle to a conclusion that involuntarily
institutionalized individuals with intellectual disabilities (a class
narrower than simply "the disabled") are a quasi-suspect class under
the Equal Protection Clause, and that their confinement must be
subject to heightened scrutiny. Where that confinement is
unnecessary, and the person could benefit from community services,
institutionalization - to use the test for analysis of quasi-suspect
classifications - does not "serve important governmental objectives
and [is not] substantially related to achievement of those
objectives.' 46
In Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett,147 a
damages case by disabled state employees, the Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity protects the state from
damages liability under Title 1 of the ADA. Relying on Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,148 the Court concluded that "the
disabled" are not a quasi-suspect class under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 149 The petitioners in Garrett were a woman with breast
cancer and a man with asthma. Cleburne's rejection of a quasi-
suspect class approach for "the large and amorphous class of the
mentally retarded" was appealing to the Supreme Court in Garrett.
The concern was that labeling the disabled a quasi-suspect class
might support similar labeling of such generic groups as "the aging,
the disabled, the mentally ill, and the infirm."
'1 50
Disabilities in Equal Protection Cases, 15 PACE L. REV. 621, 663 (1995) (in the ADA, Congress
attempted to utilize Carolene Products findings to imply that a "heightened level of scrutiny" should be
utilized under the ADA); see also Crowder v. Kitagawa, 842 F. Supp. 1257, 1264 (D. Haw. 1994)
(assuming application of strict scrutiny level in ADA cases).
146. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976).
147. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001).
148. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidating a zoning
regulation which precluded a community home for individuals with retardation).
149. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367.
150. Id. at 366 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 446). One commentator makes a cogent argument that
there is a tension between the Supreme Court's decision in Garrett (declining to find "the disabled" a
quasi-suspect class) and CleburnelOlmstead. Sean Pevsner, Reasonable Accommodations as
Constitutional Obligations, 7 TEx. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 317, 317 (2002) (suggesting that Olmstead and
Cleburne in essence, if not in haec verba, balance individual rights and state interests in a manner
consistent with the quasi-suspect classification approach).
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Cleburne, however, did not simply reject the zoning rule at issue as
if it were an irrational commercial regulation. The scrutiny was more
intense than that under the traditional rational basis test. As Judge
Posner in dissent observed in a case involving zoning regulation and
churches, "But one has only to read a little further in the Cleburne
opinion to realize that the Court was not treating the zoning
discrimination at issue there as it would have treated a discrimination
in the taxation of railroads or the zoning of bowling alleys." 15' Judge
Posner wisely urges a deeper reading of the case:
We should follow what the Supreme Court does and not just
what it says it is doing. The Court rejects a "sliding scale"
approach to equal protection in words but occasionally accepts it
in deeds. Cleburne instantiates though it does not articulate the
proposition that discrimination against sensitive uses is to be
given more careful, realistic, skeptical scrutiny by the courts than
discrimination against purely commercial activities. 152
Indeed, a separate opinion in Cleburne joined by three of the
Justices points out that the majority in fact employs, at the least, a
"second order rational basis review," not the traditional deferential
test:
The Court holds the ordinance invalid on rational-basis grounds
and disclaims that anything special, in the form of heightened
scrutiny, is taking place. Yet Cleburne's ordinance surely would
be valid under the traditional rational-basis test applicable to
economic and commercial regulation. In my view, it is important
to articulate, as the Court does not, the facts and principles that
justify subjecting this zoning ordinance to the searching review-
the heightened scrutiny-that actually leads to its invalidation....
[T]he Court does not label its handiwork heightened scrutiny,
151. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. City of Chicago, 342 F.3d 752, 770 (7th Cir. 2003) (zoning
restrictions on churches).
152. Id. (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996); cf.
Lawrence v. Texas, supra, 123 S.Ct. at 2482).
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and perhaps the method employed must hereafter be called
'second order' rational-basis review rather than 'heightened
scrutiny.' But however labeled, the rational-basis test invoked
today is most assuredly not the rational-basis test of Williamson
v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 75 S.Ct. 461, 99
L.Ed. 563 (1955), Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S.
522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959), and their progeny. 153
A proper and Cleburne-Garrett consistent rule would define as a
quasi-suspect (if not suspect) class those who are institutionalized.
These are individuals deprived of liberty, excluded from the
community, and recognized as deserving of special protection both
under general due process principles and the ADA's integration
mandate. 154 This cabined definition answers Cleburne's slippery
slope concern that those in the general populace like the aging and
infirm might be swept into a tight equal protection standard.
Cleburne's disquiet with designating the amorphous class of "the
disabled" a quasi-suspect or suspect class is warranted. "Although it
is often expressed in medical or functional terms, "disability" is a
social construct and therefore is assigned different meanings in
different contexts."' 55 For example, the 2000 United States Census
uses a variety of definitions of disability, including sensory disability,
physical disability, mental disability, self-care disability, "going-
outside-the-home disability," and employment disability.'5 6 The
ADA, the Fair Housing Act, the Rehabilitation Act, and laws
distributing public benefits also have sui generis definitions of
disability.'57
153. Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 458.
154. See sources cited supra notes 150-52.
155. Henry Korman, Clash of the Integrationists: The Mismatch of Civil Rights Imperatives in
Supportive Housing for People with Disabilities, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 3, 7 (2007).
156. QI WANG, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORTS, DISABILrrY AND AMERICAN
FAMILIES: 2000, at 2 (2005), available at www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/censr-23.pdf.
157. Korman, supra note 155, at 8-9 (enumerating various disability definitions). The Americans with
Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 112 Stat. 3553, 110th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Sept. 25, 2008), is mainly a re-definition of disabilities, as well as a refutation of certain Supreme Court
decisions which narrowed the class of people covered by the ADA.
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San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,158 the
school financing case, finding no fundamental right to education and
no suspect class, does not negate a right to treatment in the
community. The Supreme Court made it quite clear in Rodriguez that,
had there been an absolute deprivation of education, or had the class
been defined in more explicit terms, the result could have been
different. My argument is that institutionalization is close enough to
an absolute deprivation, especially where it is shown that there is no
necessity for the confinement. The limitations of the class definition
proposed here render the discrimination fit for intense Fourteenth
Amendment scrutiny.
4. Institutionalization Must Be Justified by a Compelling State
Interest
Discriminatory institutionalization is prohibited by the Equal
Protection Clause's separate strand which subjects to searching
judicial review state systems which systematically deprive
individuals of fundamental rights. The Supreme Court has held that
"any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of [a
fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional."' 59 There is no
doubt that there is a constitutional right to be free from unjustified
institutionalization. 160
In Tennessee v. Lane, holding that Title II of the ADA is a valid
exercise under the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to cases
implicating the fundamental right of access to the courts, the
Supreme Court observed that Title II of the ADA was enacted
"against a backdrop of pervasive unequal treatment in the
administration of state services and programs, including systematic
deprivations of fundamental rights" and found that Title II addresses
158. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982) (minor alien children have right to education); San
Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973) (education is not a fundamental right).
159. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis added); see Skinner v. Oklahoma ex
rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (subjecting to strict scrutiny a law providing for compulsory
sterilization of habitual criminals).
160. See sources cited supra notes 102-09.
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the deprivation of certain "basic constitutional guarantees,
infringements of which are subject to more searching judicial
review." 161 Among the examples cited are cases involving
institutional deprivation of liberty. 162 The Lane reasoning applies
with equal force to institutionalization. It is not subject to question,
therefore, that needless institutionalization of people with intellectual
disabilities, as proscribed by Olmstead on statutory grounds, is an
exercise of state power which constitutionally must be justified by a
compelling state interest.
D. Subsidiary Questions
There are two subsidiary questions which are distinct from the
thesis of this article but which are often enmeshed with community
services litigation under the ADA and the Constitution. These
questions are alive at the periphery of the central issues discussed
above. They have substance. It is important to acknowledge them.
1. Does the Right to Community Services Protect People Not (Yet)
Institutionalized?
This article highlights the constitutional rights of people in
institutions. There are many other individuals who, living at home or
elsewhere, are on the cusp of institutionalization. They may require
services if institutionalization is to be avoided. Post-Olmstead, these
individuals are protected by the statute and, I suggest, by the
Constitution.
Courts have held that the integration mandate applies equally to
individuals already institutionalized and "at risk" of
institutionalization. 163 One court reached this conclusion on account
of the absence of language in the statute and regulations
"suggest[ing] that a plaintiff must currently be institutionalized to
161. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 510, 522-23 (2004).
162. Lane, 541 U.S. at 523-24.
163. Fisher v. Okla. Health Care Auth., 335 F.3d 1175, 1181 (10th Cir. 2003); M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1309 (D. Utah 2003).
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bring a claim under the ADA or Rehabilitation Act."' 164 The Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the integration mandate "would be meaningless
if plaintiffs were required to segregate themselves by entering an
institution before they could challenge an allegedly discriminatory
law or policy that threatens to force them into segregated
isolation."' 65 Olmstead's proscription of "unjustified isolation" is
consistent with this approach.
There is authority that neither due process nor equal protection
principles protect individuals living at home from government budget
cuts resulting in reduction of their services.1 66 However, with an
analysis informed by Olmstead, and a finely-tuned emphasis on the
factual "at risk" question, the result of similar litigation has
appropriately been different.
67
The rationale is straightforward and persuasive: restriction of the
claim to those already institutionalized would force community
plaintiffs to "choose between staying in the community without any
services or entering an institution in order to receive services."' 168 One
need not be at the institution's door to be at risk. The fragility of
one's situation in the community is sufficient.
2. Does the Right to Community Services Protect People Who Are
"Voluntarily " Institutionalized?
There is support in the case law for the notion that voluntariness in
the context of institutionalization of people with intellectual
disabilities is an illusory concept, and that therefore there is no basis
164. MA.C., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
165. Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1181. The court also noted that there is nothing in Olmstead which requires
"pre-suit" institutionalization before bringing suit to enforce the ADA's integration requirement. Id.
166. E.g., Phila. Police & Fire Ass'n for Handicapped Children, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 874 F.2d
156, 163 (3d Cir. 1989).
167. Fisher, 335 F.3d at 1184 (three individuals with medical-physical handicaps at risk of nursing
home institutionalization on account of state decision to limit medically-necessary prescription
medications to five per month; "plaintiffs' precarious health and finances" triggers "substantial risk" of
harm of institutionalization); M.A.C., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1309 (waiting list under Medicaid Waiver);
Martin v. Taft, 222 F. Supp. 2d 940, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (people with developmental disabilities
eligible to be moved from large private ICF/MR facilities to non-institutional, integrated community-
based housing).
168. MA.C., 284 F. Supp. 2d at 1309.
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for treating them differently from those involuntarily civilly
committed. Residents of state mental retardation facilities have
generally not consented to their institutionalization. As one court
explained:
First, the plaintiffs who are residents of the Grafton state school
have not, in most cases, voluntarily consented to their
confinement in any meaningful sense of the word "voluntary."
North Dakota Century Code, Chapter 25-04, allows for the
admission of mentally deficient persons upon the application of a
parent or guardian without the consent of the person involved.
The statute in no way makes the consent of the person concerned
a condition of admittance. Further, in the case of plaintiffs who
are severely retarded, informed consent is not even possible. And
even in the case of the plaintiffs who are capable of giving
informed consent to admission, it may be questioned whether
such consent is voluntary in light of pressures from family and
the high cost and unavailability of alternative care.
169
Cases which superficially take the opposite position, that voluntary
submission to state custody does not trigger constitutional
protections, 170 concur: "Indeed, even commitments formally labeled
169. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 561 F. Supp. 473, 484 (D.N.D. 1982). Accord
Kentucky Ass'n for Retarded Citizens v. Conn, 510 F. Supp. 1233, 1248 (W.D. Ky. 1980); Halderman
v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1311 (E.D. Pa. 1977) ("[T]he notion of
voluntariness in connection with admission as well as in connection with the right to leave Pennhurst is
an illusory concept. Few if any residents now have, nor did they have at the time of admission, any
adequate alternative to their institutionalization."); see, e.g., Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 93 n.7 (3d Cir.
1986) (Becker, J., concurring); United States v. Pennsylvania, 832 F. Supp. 122, 124 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
("[W]here the initial institutionalization of an individual is made pursuant to a 'voluntary' decision, such
institutionalization in its course may become one which necessarily curtails an individual's liberty...
."); New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc., v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752, 762 (E.D.N.Y.
1973); see Phyllis Podolsky Dietz, Note, The Constitutional Right to Treatment in Light of Youngberg v.
Romeo, 72 GEO. L.J. 1785, 1791 (1984).
170. Torisky v. Schweiker, 446 F.3d 438, 446 (3d Cir. 2006) ("Thus, a custodial relationship
created merely by an individual's voluntary submission to state custody is not a 'deprivation of liberty'
sufficient to trigger the protections of Youngberg.").
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as 'voluntary' may arguably amount to de facto deprivations of
liberty from their inception."'
17 1
A reasonable framework is that adopted under the ADA in a recent
decision. 172 "The ADA's preference for integrated settings is not
consistent with a procedure in which remaining at STS is the default
option for residents. The defendants cannot establish compliance with
the integration mandate by showing that class members never
requested community placement."'
173
Neither the lack of a request for placement, nor nominal voluntary
status, should be determinative of whether a person in an institution is
eligible to be provided community services.
E. The Benefits of Recognition of the Constitutional Right to
Community Services
Recognition of the constitutional right to community services
described in this article would provide an "Olmstead Plus" footing
for analysis of the rights of the institutionalized. There would be a
reduction in reliance on other statutes. 174 The force inherent in
enforcement of civil rights under the Constitution would augment the
attention to detail found in the ADA statute and regulations. Certain
defenses would evaporate or be diminished.
States often assert some variation of 11 th Amendment sovereign
immunity in response to claims for expansion of community services
171. Torisky, 446 F.3d at 446 (citing case law and Sarah C. Kellogg, Note, The Due Process Right to
a Safe and Humane Environment for Patients in State Custody: The Voluntary/Involuntary Distinction,
23 AM. J.L. & MED. 339, 341-43 (1997)).
172. See generally Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 337 (D. Conn. 2008).
173. Id.
174. With an Olmstead-strengthened ADA augmented by constitutional rights to community services,
reference to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, long on shaky ground, would be unnecessary in this
regard. A number of courts have held that the denial of community-based habilitation services to
mentally disabled individuals does not constitute a viable cause of action under section 504. E.g., Sabo
v. O'Bannon, 586 F. Supp. 1132, 1137 (E.D. Pa. 1984); see Ky. Ass'n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v.
Conn, 674 F.2d 582, 585 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1041 (1982) (holding that section 504
does not include a legislative mandate for deinstitutionalization); see also Manecke v. Sch. Bd., 553 F.
Supp. 787, 790 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 762 F.2d 912 (11th Cir. 1985); Garrity
v. Gallen, 522 F. Supp. 171, 213 (D.N.H. 1981). See generally Conner v. Branstad, 839 F. Supp. 1346
(S.D. Iowa 1993). These holdings, however, do not necessarily exclude application of section 504 to
egregious discrimination in a particular individual case.
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under the ADA. Regardless of their validity, 175 a constitutional basis
for community services eviscerates the sovereign immunity defense.
For legislation enacted under Congress' spending power, the remedy
for violation is generally not a private right of action, but an action by
the federal government to terminate the funds provided to the state. 1
76
Internal deficiencies in Olmstead would be mitigated. 177  The
fundamental alteration defense would have less traction in the face of
assertion of constitutional rights. 178 An "effectively working plan"
would need to satisfy standards for protection of fundamental
constitutional rights, not simply statutory rights. The absence of
guidance on standard of care in Olmstead is a gap which may now be
filled by Youngberg-based integration case law supplemented by
Olmstead's "handle and benefit from" community services. On
another deficiency, the lack of guidance on the future of institutional
care, one may look to recent case law which establishes that each
resident must at least be considered for placement.
CONCLUSION
Challenges to institutionalization are high profile for
understandable reasons including, for example, curtailment of liberty,
high cost of services, deprivation of rights, a history of mistreatment
and lack of care, and intensity of public and judicial scrutiny.
175. The Supreme Court suggested in dicta that ADA claims which seek prospective injunctive relief
are not barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
374 n.9 (2001).
176. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28 (1981); M.A.C. v. Betit, 284 F.
Supp. 2d 1298, 1302 (D. Utah 2003) (class action by individuals living in the community on waiting list
for Medicaid Waiver community services; rejecting challenge to cap on number of persons served).
177. See Steven Schwartz, The Potential and Risks of Relying on Title I1's Integration Mandate to
Close Segregated Institutions, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2010) (critique and interpretation of
Olmstead).
178. See generally Olmstead v. J.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999). Establishment of the suggested rights might
risk an inappropriate importing of the Olmstead limitations into constitutional analysis. The fundamental
alteration defense available under Olmstead has already affected (or infected) due process analysis. In
Williams v. Wasserman, 164 F. Supp. 2d 591, 627 (D. Md. 2001), the court found the fundamental
alteration limitation on the ADA's integration mandate to be acceptable under due process standards as a
basis to "confine patients to mental institutions who do not belong there" if the "state acts reasonably to
implement community placement, without arbitrary or undue delay in light of legitimate budget
constraints and the competing demands of other disabled citizens."
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In Olmstead, the Supreme Court accepted the Nation's conclusion
that community services are superior to institutional services.
Institutional administrators generally agree that, with appropriate
support, their residents could be well served in the community. This
was the case for Pennhurst (decided in 1978) and for Southbury
Training School (decided 30 years later in 2008). 179 In many ways,
this diminishing group is a "Moses generation." Only a small
proportion of people with intellectual disabilities live in institutions
and the number has dropped significantly.' 80 Most of the residents
entered the institution before the explosion of community services
over the last several decades, and many have not, or will not,
experience personally the fruition of that community service
development.
This is a time to circle back to those constitutional principles on
which the rights of people with disabilities were recognized decades
ago. These principles both support the ADA's integration mandate
and mitigate the weaknesses of a purely ADA approach.
The involuntary institutionalization of people with intellectual
disabilities is unconstitutional on due process and equal protection
grounds where it is unjustified in the sense recognized in Olmstead,
that is, when they can "handle and benefit from" community services
based on professional assessment. Periodic review of each person's
need for institutionalization is required.
179. Compare Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
("All the parties in this litigation are in agreement that given appropriate community facilities, all the
residents at Pennhurst, even the most profoundly retarded with multiple handicaps, should be living in
the community."), with Messier v. Southbury Training Sch., 562 F. Supp. 2d 294, 326 (D. Conn. 2008):
The defendants do not seem to dispute that many or all class members could be placed in
the community under the right circumstances. The defendants' witnesses, including
officials at STS, rejected a so-called "readiness model" and testified that anyone currently
placed at STS could live in the community if provided with the appropriate "supports and
services."
180. Between 1990 and 2008, the number of individuals in public mental retardation institutions has
fallen 66% from 84,239 to 35,051. See Lakin supra at note 44. Fifteen years ago, there were an
estimated 4,132,878 people in the United States with mental retardation or developmental disabilities.
RESEARCH AND TRAINING CENTER ON COMMUNITY LIVING, INSTITUTE ON COMMUNITY INTEGRATION,
UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA, PREVALENCE OF MENTAL RETARDATION AND/OR DEVELOPMENTAL
DISABILITIES: ANALYSIS OF THE 1994/1995 NHIS-D (2000), available at http://rtc.umn.edu/docs/dddb2-
I .pdf. At roughly the same time (1999), there were 49,105 people in public institutions. See Lakin et al.,
supra note 44, at 406.
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Restoration of the constitutional dimension to the conversation
encourages reasoned discussion of both the opportunities and the
deficits in the Olmstead statutory approach. Recognition of the
constitutional right to community services is an opening to move
further toward an end to unjustified institutionalization.
Both the Constitution and the Americans with Disabilities Act
advance the integration of people with disabilities in our society. The
constitutional scholar Jacobus tenBroek urged "integrationalism." He
"called for the full and equal participation in society of persons with
disabilities.",181 "Without that right, that policy, that world, it is not
living.'
' 82
181. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L.
REV. 841, 843 (1966) (defining the policy of integrationism as "a policy entitling the disabled to full
participation in the life of the community and encouraging and enabling them to do so .... ).
182. Id. at 918, quoted in Peter Blanck, The Right to Live in the World: Disability Yesterday, Today,
and Tomorrow, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 367, 401 (2008).
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